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We analyzed 714 jury verdicts in informed consent cases tried in 25 states in
1985–2002 to determine whether the applicable standard of care (“patient”
vs. “professional” standard) affected the outcome. Verdicts for plaintiffs
were significantly more frequent in states with a patient standard than in
states with a professional standard (27 percent vs. 17 percent, P = 0.02). This
difference in outcomes did not hold for other types of medical malpractice
litigation (36 percent vs. 37 percent, P = 0.8). The multivariate odds of a
plaintiff’s verdict were more than twice as high in states with a patient
standard than in states with a professional standard (odds ratio = 2.15, 95%
confidence interval = 1.32–3.50). The law’s expectations of clinicians with
respect to risk disclosure appear to vary geographically.
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I. Introduction
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s
consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.1
Beginning in 1914 with Justice Cardozo’s now-famous pronouncement in
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, the legal doctrine of informed
consent has matured through a series of important court decisions.2 Early
cases alleging failure to obtain consent for medical care were tried as cases of
battery—literally, unconsented touching.3 Eventually, courts moved toward
evaluating informed consent claims using negligence law.4 A “professional”
standard applied, meaning that the question of whether the defendant’s
behavior had breached the standard of care was determined by reference to
what the defendant’s professional peers characterized as reasonable or cus-
tomary medical practice, drawing informed consent doctrine into line with
other forms of medical malpractice litigation.5
The most significant development in the law of informed consent
during the last 40 years has been a reformulation of the negligence standard
in circumstances involving disclosure of treatment risks.6 Two 1972 cases,
Canterbury v. Spence7 and Cobbs v. Grant,8 shifted the focus of the inquiry from
physician to patient by creating a “lay” or “patient” standard. According to
this standard, allegations of failure to disclose are to be judged according to
jury assessments of what a reasonable patient in the plaintiff’s position would
expect to be told prior to making a decision about treatment (patient
1Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
2Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d. 1 (Cal. 1972);
Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393 (Kan. 1960); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317
P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
3Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261 (Minn. 1905).
4Jay Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient 65–69 (2002).
5William P. Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 189 (5th ed. 1984).
6Ruth Faden & Thomas Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent (1986).
7464 F.2d at 781–88.
8502 P.2d at 10–12.
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standard), rather than testimony by medical experts about which risks and
alternatives physicians customarily convey (professional standard). “It is the
prerogative of the patient, not the physician,” Judge Robinson declared in
Canterbury, “to determine for himself the direction in which his interests
seem to lie.”9
The Canterbury and Cobbs decisions have spawned an intriguing schism
in American health law. In the decades following, superior courts in most
states have weighed them, or their progeny, and ruled to accept or reject the
departure from conventional malpractice law. Some states underpinned a
common-law shift to the patient standard with explicit statutory statements
establishing this standard as the correct one in cases involving allegations
that material risks of treatment went undisclosed.10 Other states have gone in
the opposite direction, using statutory affirmations of the professional stan-
dard to counteract such judicial innovation.11
The upshot is that 25 states and the District of Columbia have
embraced the patient standard, while 23 have maintained the professional
standard. The laws in the remaining two states, Colorado and Georgia, are
not easily classifiable as one or the other. Figure 1 provides a pictorial
snapshot. Table 1 identifies the statutes and leading cases that enunciate the
applicable standard in each state.
The notoriety and watershed nature of the Canterbury and Cobbs
decisions has extended their influence beyond the United States.
Appellate courts in Australia,12 Malaysia,13 New Zealand,14 Ireland,15
9464 F.2d at 781.
10Paul C. Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial 30 (1991); Alan Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick,
Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
407 (1980).
11This legislative move was particularly evident following tort “crises” in the mid-1970s and
mid-1980s when statutory provisions affirming the professional standard were sometimes
included in state tort reform packages, presumably because they were regarded by lawmakers as
one mechanism among several for reducing the volume and costs of malpractice litigation.
12Naxakis v. Western Gen. Hosp. (1999) 73 A.L.J.R. 782; Rogers v. Whittaker (1992) 175 C.L.R. 479.
13Hong Chuan Lay v. Dr. Eddie Soo Fook Mun (1998) 5 C.L.J. 251; Kamalam v. Eastern
Plantation Agency (1996) 4 M.L.J. 674.
14B v. Medical Council (High Court, Auckland HC11/1996, 8 July 1996).
15Geoghegan v. Harris, [2000] I.R. 536.
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and Canada16 have grappled with the appropriate standard for disclosure of
treatment risks, and opted for a patient standard. Courts in Singapore,17 on
the other hand, have explicitly rejected the patient standard in favor of a
professional one. In England, the professional standard has historically gov-
erned,18 although there have been some recent signs of erosion of this
deference to professional opinion in English negligence law.19
16Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880.
17Jason Carlos Francisco v. Dr. L.M. Thng & Singapore Gen. Hosp. (Suit No. 573 of 1998,
unreported).
18Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlehem Royal Hosp., [1985] A.C. 871; Bolam v. Friern
Hosp. Mgmt. Comm. (1957) 2 All E.R. 118.
19Bolitho v. City & Hackney Health Auth. (1997) 4 All E.R. 771; Margot Brazier & Jose Miola,
Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation Revolution? 8 Med. L. Rev. 85 (2000); General Medical
Council, Seeking Patients’ Consent: The Ethical Considerations (1998), available at 〈http://
www.gmc-uk.org/standards/consent.htm#note_2〉.
Figure 1: Disclosure standards for informed consent in the United States.*
Patient standard
Professional standard
Hybrid standard †
*Depicts laws in place through 2002.
†Colorado and Georgia are classified as “hybrid” because their laws blend aspects of the patient
and professional standards, without expressing a clear preference for either.
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Table 1: Legal Bases of Disclosure Standards, by State*
State Standard Statutes Leading Cases
Alabama Professional — Fain v. Smith, 470 So. 2d
1150 (Ala. 1985)
Alaska Patient Alaska Stat. § 09.55.556(a) Korman v. Mallin, 858 P.2d
1145 (Alaska 1993)
Arizona Professional — Riedisser v. Nelson, 534 P.2d
1052 (Ariz. 1975)
Arkansas Professional Ark. Code Ann.
§ 16-114-206
Eady v. Lansford, 92 S.W.3d
57 (Ark. 2002)
Fuller v. Starnes, 597 S.W.2d
88 (Ark. 1980)
California Patient — Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1
(Cal. 1972)
Colorado Hybrid — Gorab v. Zook, 943 P.2d
423, 427–28 (Colo.
1997)
Connecticut Patient — Godwin v. Danbury Eye
Physicians & Surgeons,
757 A.2d 516 (Conn.
2000)
D.C. Patient — Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d
558 (D.C. 1982)
Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.
1972)
Delaware Professional Del. Code Ann. tit. 18,
§ 6852
DiFilippo v. Preston, 173
A.2d 333 (Del. 1961)
Florida Professional — Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So.
2d 226 (Fla. App. 1966)
Georgia Hybrid Ga. Code Ann. § 31-9-6.1 Albany Urology Clinic. v.
Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777
(Ga. 2000)
Hawaii Patient Haw. Rev. Stat. § 671-3 Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489
(Haw. 1995)
Idaho Professional Idaho Code Ann.
§ 39-4304
Sherwood v. Carter, 805 P.2d
452 (Idaho 1991)
Illinois Professional — Weekly v. Solomon, 510
N.E.2d 152 (Ill.App. 2
Dist. 1987)
Indiana Professional Ind. Code § 16-36-1.5-7 Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602
N.E.2d 98 (Ind. 1992)
Iowa Patient — Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist
Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d
355 (Iowa 1987)
Kansas Professional — Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d
1093 (Kan. 1960)
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Table 1. Continued
State Standard Statutes Leading Cases
Kentucky Professional Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 304.40-320
Holton v. Pfingst, 534
S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1976)
Louisiana Patient La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:1299.40
Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher,
553 So. 2d 398 (La.
1988)
Maine Professional Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24
§ 2905
Woolley v. Henderson, 418
A.2d 1123 (Me. 1980)
Maryland Patient — Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d
1014 (Md. 1977)
Massachusetts Patient — Harnish v. Children’s Hosp.
Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d
240 (Mass. 1982)
Michigan Professional — Roberts v. Young, 119
N.W.2d 627 (Mich.
1963)
Minnesota Patient — Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 295
N.W.2d 638 (Minn.
1980)
Mississippi Patient — Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d
385 (Miss. 1985)
Missouri Professional — Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d
668 (Mo. 1965)
Montana Professional — Negaard v. Feda’s Estate, 446
P.2d 436 (Mont. 1968)
Nebraska Professional Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-2816 Smith v. Weaver, 407
N.W.2d 174 (Neb. 1987)
Nevada Professional Nev. Rev. Stat. § 449.710 Smith v. Cotter, 810 P.2d
1204 (Nev. 1991)
New
Hampshire
Professional — Folger v. Corbett, 394 A.2d
63 (N.H. 1978)
New Jersey Patient — Largey v. Rothman, 540
A.2d 504 (N.J. 1988)
New
Mexico
Patient — Gerety v. Demers, 589 P.2d
180 (N.M. 1978)
New York Professional N.Y. Pub. Health Law
§ 2805-d
Troy v. Long Island
Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr.,
446 N.Y.S.2d 347 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1982)
North
Carolina
Professional N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.13 Foard v. Jarman, 387 S.E.2d
162 (N.C. 1990)
North
Dakota
Patient — Jaskoviak v. Gruver, 638
N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 2002)
Ohio Patient — Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477
N.E.2d 1145 (Ohio
1985)
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Patient standards for disclosure have been lauded as progressive from
a patients’ rights perspective, but little is known about their impact. We
analyzed a sample of informed consent verdicts across multiple U.S. juris-
dictions to test whether the type of legal standard applied affected outcomes
of litigation. Our hypothesis was that plaintiffs would tend to fare better
when their cases were decided under a patient standard.
Table 1. Continued
State Standard Statutes Leading Cases
Oklahoma Patient — Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d
554 (Okla. 1980)
Oregon Patient Or. Rev. Stat. § 677.097 Macy v. Blatchford, 8 P.3d
204 (Or. 2000)
Pennsylvania Patient 40 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 1303.504
Sinclair by Sinclair v. Block,
633 A.2d 1137 (Pa.
1993)
Rhode
Island
Patient — Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d
676, 689 (R.I. 1972)
South
Carolina
Professional — Hook v. Rothstein, 316
S.E.2d 690, 698 (S.C.
App. 1984)
South
Dakota
Patient — Wheeldon v. Madison, 374
N.W.2d 367 (S.D. 1985)
Tennessee Patient Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 29-26-118
Ashe v. Radiation Oncology
Assoc., 9 S.W.3d 119
(Tenn. 1999)
Texas Patient Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 4590i, § 6.02
Peterson v. Shields, 652
S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1983)
Utah Patient Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5 Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d
348 (Utah 1980)
Vermont Patient Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12,
§ 1909
Small v. Gifford Mem’l
Hosp., 349 A.2d 703 (Vt.
1975)
Virginia Professional — Rizzo v. Schiller, 445 S.E.2d
153 (Va. 1994)
Washington Patient Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 7.70.050
Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d
852, 860 (Wash. App.
1974)
West
Virginia
Patient — Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d
446, 455 (W.Va. 1982)
Wisconsin Patient Wis. Stat. Ann. § 448.30 Martin by Scoptur v.
Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70
(Wis. 1995)
Wyoming Professional — Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d
108, 112 (Wyo. 1989)
*Summarizes laws in place through 2002.
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II. Methods
A. Data and Sample
Our data came from case summaries compiled by 16 jury verdict publishers
covering 29 states and the District of Columbia. The publishers, which
produce the California Jury Verdicts Weekly, the Florida Jury Verdict Reporter,
and the Northwest Personal Injury Litigation Reports, are private companies
that specialize in summarizing state court decisions in all types of civil
litigation.20 The publishers use a variety of approaches to identify decisions,
including periodic reviews of court dockets, surveys of attorneys involved in
the litigation, voluntary reports from involved attorneys, and news and wire
reports. Each publisher then uses a standard template to record details of the
decisions. Case details are obtained primarily through attorney surveys,
although some publishers also collect information through direct observa-
tion of trials. Before finalizing reports, publishers attempt to verify their
accuracy by circulating draft reports to attorneys involved in the case. The
reports are used widely by attorneys and insurers for case evaluation and
litigation strategy, and have been used in previous studies of litigation.21
Lexis-Nexis catalogues the case reports electronically. We searched for
verdicts from the period 1985 through 2002 that included the term
“informed consent.” The search yielded 2,783 reports, 1,614 of which were
from California. We limited California’s contribution to 200 verdicts selected
at random; for the other states, we sampled all verdicts from the study time
period.
Two investigators then reviewed the sampled verdicts one by one
(N = 1,369). We eliminated duplicates (214); cases in which informed
consent was mentioned but there was no allegation of a breach (326); cases
in which the jury’s decision could not be linked to the informed consent
allegation due to the confounding effect of an accompanying allegation of
negligent treatment (100); 11 verdict dates outside the study range; and four
20National Association of State Jury Verdict Publishers, Jury Verdict Summaries (2002), available
at 〈 http://www.juryverdicts.com〉.
21See, e.g., Michael G. Shanley & Mark A. Peterson, RAND, Comparative Justice: Civil Jury
Verdicts in San Francisco and Cook Counties, 1959–1980 (1982); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D.
Syverud, Getting to “No”: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for
Trial, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 319 (1991); Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and
Post-Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 265 (1998).
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cases that resulted in hung juries. This process of elimination left 714 ver-
dicts from 25 states (AZ, AK, CA, CT, FL, IL, IN, KY, LA, ME, MD, MA, MI,
MO, NH, NJ, NY, OH, PA, RI, TX, VT, VA, WA, WI).
B. Verdict Review
For each case, we documented the plaintiff’s sex and age, the defendant’s
specialty, the party in whose favor the case was decided, and the dollar value
of the verdict (if any). We also flagged cases in which the verdict report
indicated that there was a factual dispute about whether the risk at issue had
been disclosed; in other words, situations in which defendants insisted that
the risk at issue had been disclosed (as opposed to the argument that there
was no obligation to disclose this risk).
Next, the subset of cases that alleged failure to disclose risks of surgery
were divided among four surgeons (one board-certified cardiothoracic
surgeon, one board-certified pediatric surgeon, and two surgical fellows)
who independently reviewed them using an instrument designed for this
purpose. The reviewers recorded the index procedure, defined as the proce-
dure most directly responsible for the adverse outcome(s) alleged by the
plaintiff, and the index adverse outcome, defined as the most serious harm
alleged by the plaintiff to be causally related to the index procedure.
Next, the reviewers scored the severity of the index adverse outcome
using the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ severity-of-
injury scale.22 This nine-point scale ranges from emotional injury only (score
of 1) to death (score of 9). Finally, the reviewers estimated the risk that the
index procedure would give rise to the index adverse outcome. Risk judg-
ments were made on a six-point nonlinear scale with the following values: 1
in 10; 1 in 50; 1 in 100; 1 in 500; 1 in 1,000; and 1 in 5,000. Reviewers chose
the probability that came closest to their determination of the risk involved
and were instructed to consult relevant literature if they were unfamiliar with
particular risks arising in the cases.
To test the reliability of the surgical review, we submitted 65 randomly
selected verdicts (about 12 percent of the sample) to independent review by
a second surgeon (one of the original four) who was blinded to the fact that
the verdict was a rereview. When these pairs of reviews were compared, injury
severity scores showed very good agreement: 48 (74 percent) of the reviews
22National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Malpractice Claims: Final Compilation (M.
Patricia Sowka ed., 1980).
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were concordant and 10 (15 percent) differed by one severity level (weighted
kappa = 0.68). Agreement on the risk scores was fair: the vast majority were
concordant (42 percent) or differed by one risk level (42 percent), but eight
(12 percent) differed by two risk levels and three (5 percent) by three risk
levels (weighted kappa = 0.28). After concluding the reliability testing, the
investigators discussed disagreements with the reviewers to reach consensus.
C. Control for the General Malpractice Litigation Environment
We generated a variable to control for aspects of a state’s legal environment,
other than the informed consent standard, that might affect plaintiffs’
chances of prevailing in a medical malpractice case. For each of the 25 states
represented in the study sample, we drew from the Lexis-Nexis database an
additional sample of medical malpractice verdicts decided between 1985 and
2002 that did not involve issues of informed consent. We randomly sampled
of 100 verdicts from each of 12 states. The remaining 13 states had fewer
than 100 available verdicts, so we sampled all available (range of 2–33,
mean = 17). We then calculated a simple plaintiff win rate by state, which was
the proportion of malpractice verdicts decided for the plaintiff.
D. State Law Review
We undertook a 50-state review of state statutes and controlling court deci-
sions concerning the applicable legal standard for informed consent cases.
(The results appear in Figure 1 and Table 1). The review was conducted in
early 2003, and summarizes the laws in place through 2002 to match the time
period from which verdicts came. It is possible that some changes to
informed consent law have occurred since this time.23
E. Statistical Analysis
Our analyses focused on verdicts that involved allegations of failure to dis-
close surgical risks, both because it was feasible to assign measures of risk to
this class of cases and because they constituted the vast majority of informed
consent verdicts. We generated descriptive statistics, with verdicts grouped
according to whether they came from states with a patient or professional
23We are aware of one such change. The Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement
Act, enacted in 2003, contained informed consent reforms that may be construed as shifting
Texas over to a professional standard (see Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 204, § 10.01, eff. Sept. 1,
2003).
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standard. The severity-of-injury scores were collapsed into three levels: minor
(emotional only, temporary-minor, temporary-significant); significant
(temporary-major, permanent-minor, permanent-significant); and major
(major-permanent, grave, death). To account for the differences in the
timing of verdicts, we converted the dollar values of awards to 2002 dollars
using the Consumer Price Index.24
We plotted the mean proportion of plaintiff wins within each state, and
then compared overall means from the two types of jurisdictions. The same
plots and jurisdictional comparisons were done for the malpractice cases not
involving informed consent. Seven states with professional standards (AZ, IL,
IN, KY, ME, NH, VA) and three states with patient standards (AK, LA, RI)
contributed five or fewer informed consent verdicts to the sample. To avoid
instability in our estimates, we clustered them and calculated a single mean
for each cluster.
Finally, we tested the relationship between the informed consent stan-
dard and case outcomes using multivariate logistic regression. The depen-
dent variable was the prevailing party (plaintiff or defendant). The
independent variables were the applicable standard (professional or
patient), the risk rating, the injury severity, the plaintiff’s gender, the plain-
tiff’s age, a binary variable indicating whether there was a factual dispute
about the disclosure, verdict year, and the state-specific patient win rate for
medical malpractice litigation unrelated to informed consent.
The regression analysis was weighted to allow each state to contribute
equal explanatory power, regardless of the actual number of verdicts it had
in the sample. The two clusters of low-count states described above were
weighted as if they were single states. All analyses were conducted using the
Stata/SE 8.0 statistical software package (Stata Corp., College Station, TX).
III. Results
Eighty-eight percent of informed consent verdicts related to surgical proce-
dures (Table 2). The dominant allegation in these cases was that the surgeon
failed to warn the patient of pertinent risks (89 percent). Among cases that
did not involve surgery, failure to disclose risks was also the most common
24U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Inflation Calculator, available at
〈http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl〉.
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allegation (53 percent); in most cases the risks pertained to drug side effects
(39 percent of nonsurgical cases). Only 11 cases, all of them nonsurgical
in nature, dealt with allegations of outright failure to obtain consent for
treatment.
Table 3 shows characteristics of the 555 surgical cases involving risk
disclosure. Plaintiffs won 24 percent of them, receiving a mean award of
approximately $1.2 million. One-quarter of cases involved minor harm; the
rest alleged significant (71 percent) or major (6 percent) injury. Defendants
came from a wide range of surgical specialties, most frequently orthopedic
(20 percent), general (16 percent), and plastic/reconstructive (16 percent).
The procedures involved were also diverse; the most common were tooth
extraction (9 percent), foot surgery (7 percent), breast surgery (6 percent),
spinal surgery (6 percent), and hysterectomy/sterilization (6 percent). The
mean risk rating of 3.6 corresponds on the six-point scale we used to a
probability of between 1 in 100 (score of 3) and 1 in 500 (score of 4) of the
adverse outcome occurring as a result of the index procedure.
There were no statistically significant differences across the two types of
jurisdictions, with two exceptions. First, plaintiffs in states with a patient
standard were slightly younger than their counterparts in states with a pro-
fessional standard (42 vs. 45 years, P = 0.02). Second, verdicts in favor of
plaintiffs were significantly more common in states with a patient standard in
Table 2: Types of Informed Consent Verdicts
N %* N %*
Surgical Treatment 627 88 Nonsurgical Treatment† 87 12
Allegation of failure to disclose Allegation of failure to disclose
—Risks of treatment 555 89 —Risks of treatment 46 53
—Alternative treatment 58 9 —Alternative treatment 11 13
—Identity of treating clinician‡ 6 1 Allegation of absolute failure to
obtain consent for a treatment
11 13
—Clinician’s
experience/expertise
6 1 Other 8 9
Other 2 0.3
*Percentages for treatment categories are calculated from all cases in the sample (N = 714);
allegation subcategories are calculated within surgical (N = 627) and nonsurgical categories
(N = 87), respectively.
†For 11 nonsurgical cases, the nature of the allegation was not evident.
‡Allegation that consent was given for treatment by physician A, and physician B actually
delivered the treatment.
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force than in states with a professional standard (27 percent vs. 17 percent,
P = 0.02).25 One other variable, verdict amounts, trended toward a signifi-
cant difference between the two groups of states. However, the difference
was not significant at the P < 0.05 level and further testing of the equality of
the two distributions using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test also showed no sig-
nificant difference (P = 0.39).
Figure 2 shows the proportion of verdicts for the plaintiff by state and
type of jurisdiction. The left half of the figure makes the jurisdictional
comparison among informed consent verdicts; the right half compares other
malpractice litigation from the same states. The difference observed in
outcomes of informed consent cases by jurisdiction (27 percent vs. 17
percent, P = 0.02) did not hold for other types of medical malpractice liti-
gation (36 percent vs. 37 percent, P = 0.8).
Figure 2 also shows that, overall, informed consent verdicts were less
likely than other malpractice cases to result in plaintiff wins (24 percent vs.
36 percent, P < 0.001), a difference observed in every state except Washing-
ton. The proportion of informed consent verdicts that went for the plaintiff
ranged from none in Missouri (out of 10 cases) to 51 percent in New Jersey
(out of 43 cases). Among malpractice verdicts unrelated to informed
consent, plaintiffs wins ranged from 26 percent in Massachusetts to 53
percent in Florida.
The unadjusted odds of a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor were more
than twice as high in states with a patient standard than in states with a
professional standard (odds ratio (OR) = 2.58, 95% confidence interval
(CI) = 1.62–4.09). The higher odds of a patient win observed in bivariate
analysis and state-by-state plots were confirmed in multivariate analysis
(OR = 2.15, 95% CI = 1.32–3.50) (Table 4). Multivariate analysis also
showed that the odds of a plaintiff win decreased approximately 25
percent with each unit increase in the remoteness of the risk on the six-
point scale.
25We also tested for subgroup differences by comparing the plaintiff win rates across the two
groups of states within the following strata: verdict year, factual dispute, plaintiff gender,
plaintiff age, severity of injury, defendant specialty, risk of adverse outcome. The higher pro-
portion of plaintiff wins in patient standard states did not appear to be an effect localized in one
or a few of these variables. It was a fairly homogenous effect, although small sample sizes did not
support statistically significant differences in most of the comparisons.
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IV. Discussion
Absolute failure to obtain patient consent prior to treatment is an aberrant
event. Allegations in informed consent litigation typically center on whether
the consent given was “informed” and, in particular, on the extent to which
risks of treatment were adequately disclosed.26 Our study strongly suggests
that complaints about undisclosed risks in surgery account for the lion’s
share of modern informed consent litigation.
Over the last 30 years, courts have wrestled with the question of how to
define clinicians’ legal obligations relating to disclosure of treatment risks.
Two distinct camps have emerged. The traditional position is that alleged
breaches of informed consent should, in keeping with the approach taken
with other claims of medical negligence, be evaluated according to standards
of customary practice espoused by the profession.27 The alternative position
is that disclosure obligations should be derived through identification of the
kinds of risks that reasonable patients would regard as “material” to their
26Jessica W. Berg et al., Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice 55–58 (2d ed.
2001).
27Keeton et al., supra note 5, at 189, 193–95.
Table 4: Multivariate Odds of Verdict for Plaintiff in Informed
Consent Litigation*
Characteristics Odds of Plaintiff Verdict 95% Confidence Interval
Patient standard
jurisdiction
2.15† 1.32–3.50
Risk of adverse outcome‡ 0.74† 0.63–0.88
Severity category§ 1.02 0.68–1.55
Female 1.11 0.72–1.74
Age¶ 0.96 0.85–1.09
Factual dispute 0.56† 0.36–0.86
Year of verdict 1.02 0.97–1.08
Other malpractice win** 1.34 1.06–1.69
*Model weighted by state.
†P < 0.01.
‡Six-point scale ranging from probabilities of 1 in 10 (1) to 1 in 5,000 (6).
§Three-point scale comprising minor (1), significant (2), and major (3) injury.
¶Age in 10-year increments.
**Odds ratio relates to 10 percent increase in the odds of plaintiff win.
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decisions about treatment—an inquiry that reposes discretion in judges and
juries rather than relying primarily on the testimony of members of the
medical profession. Since the first statement of the patient standard was
articulated by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Canterbury
v. Spence, courts throughout the United States and in at least seven other
countries and have considered the merits of this alternative formulation.
Some commentators hailed the Canterbury decision as a consummating
moment in the patients’ rights movement;28 others criticized it for not going
far enough in recognizing patient autonomy.29 Critics in the medical com-
munity predicted that the shift would lead to amorphous standards and
burgeoning litigation.30 Implicit in all these reactions, as well as many of the
judicial considerations that followed, is that a shift to the patient standard
saddles clinicians with greater legal responsibilities around disclosure of
risks; in other words, it favors plaintiffs. This study tested that assumption.
Our analysis of informed consent verdicts from 25 states—13 with
patient standards in place and 12 with professional standards—found that
when the verdicts were grouped according to the two types of jurisdictions, the
groups were similar in virtually every respect except the odds of a verdict in the
plaintiff’s favor, which were more than twice as high in states with patient
standards. Overall, plaintiffs’ injuries were generally quite serious and payouts
were large, averaging more than $1 million per compensated case.
What are the main implications of this difference? We note three. First,
the split in disclosure standards cannot be dismissed as a matter of legal
semantics: the choice of standard influences outcomes of litigation. Moving
to a patient standard means that physician defendants incur greater expo-
sure to liability for negligence. Legislators in some states have assumed this
connection, and intervened to establish a professional standard through
statute as one method for controlling malpractice litigation.31
28Leanna W. Darvall, Medicine, Law and Social Change: The Impact of Bioethics, Feminism, and
Rights Movements on Medical Decision-Making (1993); Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing
Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 261 (1999).
29Jay Katz, Informed Consent—A Fairy Tale? Law’s Vision, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 137 (1977);
Alexander M. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123
U. Penn. L. Rev. 341 (1974).
30Eugene G. Laforet, The Fiction of Informed Consent, 235 JAMA 1579 (1976).
31Weiler, supra note 10, at 30.
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Second, our findings imply that informed consent cases with very
similar clinical facts may be decided differently depending on the state in
which they are brought. Attorneys will not balk at this type of discrepancy; it
is a predictable and accepted product of a federalist legal system. Many
physicians, on the other hand, would take a different view. Developments in
communication, medical education and training, and specialty colleges over
the past 50 years have shifted medicine toward national standards of clinical
practice.32 Geographic variation in what constitutes acceptable disclosure
cuts against the grain of such standardization in medicine. It may also send
mixed messages to physicians about the standards they should adhere to in
advising patients of treatment risks.
Third, given the crux of the distinction between the two standards, our
findings hint at a substantive discrepancy between customary medical prac-
tice regarding disclosure of risks (as enunciated through the professional
standard of care) and patients’ expectations about risk disclosure (as articu-
lated through the patient standard). Previous studies33 have identified mis-
alignment between patient and physician preferences for treatment, which is
explained as a function of divergent utilities and risk tolerance. It stands to
reason that such differences would also emerge from the application of legal
standards that cleave to the perceptions of one party or the other. An
important caveat to this conclusion is that evidence of the discrepancy
observed in this study is refracted through the legal process, which provides
only an approximation of what physicians do and patients want, and does so
in the context of adverse patient outcomes. If, for instance, under the patient
standard, juries’ ex post estimations of patient expectations diverge signifi-
cantly from patients’ true ex ante wishes, then the use of litigation outcomes
as a marker of patient preferences may be problematic.
32Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985); Clark C. Havighurst et al., Health Care Law and
Policy: Readings, Notes, and Questions 1051–65 (2d ed. 1998).
33Norman F. Boyd et al., Whose Utilities for Decision Analysis? 10 Med. Decision Making 58
(1990); Paul S. Heckerling et al., Patient or Physician Preferences for Decision Analysis: The
Prenatal Genetic Testing Decision, 19 Med. Decision Making 66 (1999); Melissa M. Holmes
et al., Women’s and Physicians’ Utilities for Health Outcomes in Estrogen Replacement
Therapy, 2 J. Gen. Internal Med. 178 (1987); Barbara J. McNeil et al., Fallacy of the Five-Year
Survival in Lung Cancer, 299 New Engl. J. Med. 1397 (1978); Saroj Saigal et al., Differences in
Preferences for Neonatal Outcomes Among Health Care Professionals, Parents, and Adoles-
cents, 281 JAMA 1991 (1999).
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Two types of confounding complicate studies of legal outcomes like
ours. One confounder arises at the state level. A pro-plaintiff tort environ-
ment may lead to both abandonment of the professional standard in favor of
a patient one and a higher probability of plaintiff verdicts. We cannot control
for the complex social, legal, and political factors that may give rise to a
relatively plaintiff-friendly culture. However, their impact should be cap-
tured largely in the outcomes of other tort litigation, especially other mal-
practice lawsuits. We investigated this possibility by analyzing a sample of
malpractice verdicts unrelated to informed consent and found no significant
difference in outcomes.
The other important confounder exists at the case level. Introduction
of a patient standard may change the mix of cases that proceed to trial. In
theory, attorneys’ response to the introduction of a more liberal standard
would be to take on and press to trial some “marginal” cases that they
previously would have rejected. Such changes in case mix frustrate cross-
jurisdictional comparisons. Our analysis mitigated the potential for system-
atic differences in the mix of cases across jurisdictions by controlling for the
procedure-specific risk of the adverse outcome in dispute. We found that the
risk levels in cases from patient standard and professional standard states
were similarly distributed, and adjusting for risk had virtually no impact on
the predictive power of jurisdiction type in the multivariate analysis. Thus,
there was little evidence that case mix differed between the two types of
jurisdictions on this important measure.
On the other hand, the risk rating was associated with case outcomes in
a logical direction. The probability of a plaintiff verdict dropped steadily
from 43 percent to 10 percent as the remoteness of the outcome increased
from 1 in 10 to 1 in 5,000. This inverse relationship between risk level and
outcome was also evident in multivariate analysis.
Although the study design was attentive to state- and case-level con-
founders, it has several methodological limitations. First, the sample consists
of verdicts only. Because legal standards were the subject of our study, and
standards emanate chiefly from court decisions and legislation, this focus was
appropriate. However, only about 5–15 percent of malpractice claims are
resolved by verdict.34 This raises the question of whether informed consent
34David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 354 New Engl. J. Med. 2024, 2026 (2006); David M. Studdert et al., The Rise of
Nursing Home Litigation: Findings from a National Survey of Attorneys, 22(2) Health Aff. 219,
224 (2003).
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cases resolved outside of court follow the pattern we observed. There are
good reasons to expect that they do. Previous research has shown that
verdicts influence negotiations over claims, with settlements occurring in the
“shadow” of court decisions.35
Second, jury verdict publishers do not capture every decision. Previ-
ous attempts to measure the proportion of verdicts captured have yielded
estimates ranging from 75 percent to 95 percent overall,36 although the
capture of personal injury cases is probably higher than other types of
litigation.37 If the outcomes of unreported verdicts are significantly differ-
ent from reported ones, plaintiff win rates may be biased in some states.
However, it seems very unlikely that such a bias would undo the systemati-
cally different win rates we observed across the two types of jurisdiction, or
that it would affect informed consent and other types of malpractice ver-
dicts differently.
Third, the surgical reviewers’ judgments about the risk of adverse
outcomes did not show high interrater reliability; this variability would be
expected to cause some random misclassification bias, which would skew the
inverse relationship we observed between risk of the adverse outcome and
the probability of plaintiff wins toward the null. Fourth, we do not measure
the impact of the respective standards on the incidence of litigation. Fifth,
while our findings are probably generalizable to other American states, their
generalizability to legal systems abroad, where a range of other legal and
social factors affect outcomes, is unknown.
In summary, our results show that moving from a professional to a
patient-based standard of care in informed consent law significantly affects
the outcomes of litigation, resulting in both higher standards for disclosure
and greater likelihood of legal judgments against physicians for breaches of
informed consent. Some will regard both these outcomes as acceptable, even
desirable. Others may support the idea of a shift toward patient-oriented
standards for disclosure, but balk at the increases in litigation and legal costs
35Samuel R. Gross & Kent A. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1996); Thomas Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes:
Imaging the Jury’s Shadow, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 43 (1991).
36Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Civil Juries and the Politics of Reform (1995); Mark A.
Peterson & George L. Priest, RAND, The Civil Jury: Trends in Trials and Verdicts, Cook County,
Ill., 1960–1979 (1982); National Association of State Jury Verdict Publishers, supra note 20.
37National Association of State Jury Verdict Publishers, supra note 20.
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that this shift may entail. Regardless of the merits of the alternative stan-
dards, their coexistence exposes a tension between law and medicine:
although the legal community embraces interjurisdictional differences, the
medical community tends to be skeptical of geographic variation in clinical
practice.38 The presence of multiple standards may also blur the law’s
message to physicians regarding how they should talk to patients about
treatment risks.
38Mark R. Chassin et al., Variations in the Use of Medical and Surgical Services by the Medicare
Population, 314 New Engl. J. Med. 285 (1986); John E. Wennberg et al., Are Hospital Services
Rationed in New Haven or Over-Utilised in Boston? 1 Lancet 1185 (1987).
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